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Mandatory PKU Screening:
The Other Side of the Looking Glass
GEORGE J. ANNAS, JD, MPH
Abstract: The challenge that PKU screening pro-
grams face is to be effective without sacrificing indi-
vidual liberty. Most states have assumed that this is
impossible, and have enacted mandatory PKU screen-
ing tests. It now appears that in fact voluntary screen-
ing for PKU can be effective. Accordingly, it seems
appropriate to reexamine existing mandatory screen-
ing statutes to determine if we can replace government
coercion with voluntary informed consent. Focus
should be placed on the proper role of the government
in screening, and on improving the consent process,
and not on those few couples who withhold consent.
(Am J Public Health 1982; 72:1401-1403.)
At one point in Lewis Carroll's Through the Looking
Glass, Alice finds herself discussing the preventive possibili-
ties of the law. The Queen tells her that the King's Messen-
ger is in prison, being punished but that his trial doesn't
begin until next week, "and of course the crime comes last
of all." Alice is shocked and asks, "Suppose he never
commits the crime?" The Queen responds, "That would be
all the better." Alice agrees that it would be better if the
crime was not committed but, "it wouldn't be all the better
his being punished for it." The Queen insists she's wrong;
that it's always better if people don't commit bad acts, even
if they're punished as if they did. If they didn't commit the
acts, "that would have been better still; better and better,
and better!" The conversation is interrupted when Alice
begins to say, "There's a mistake somewhere . . . "
Elsewhere in this issue of the Journal, Dr. Ruth Faden
and her coworkers report on their study which demonstrates
that requiring informed consent for PKU (phenylketonuria)
screening is well-accepted by the public, improves the public
knowledge about PKU screening, and does not make the
program any less cost-effective.'
I would have thought the natural conclusions to such a
study would have been a sigh of relief followed by an
affirmation of present Maryland consent policy and, per-
haps, a suggestion that states with mandatory PKU screen-
ing programs can begin to consider making them voluntary.
So it is puzzling that we are treated instead to a commentary
by three of the study's four authors arguing that the 27
parents who did refuse to have their children screened were
not morally justified.2
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It is because I believe these parents were morally
justified in their refusal, and because the study demonstrates
that PKU screening programs can be both effective and
voluntary, that I agreed to write this commentary. As Alice
put it, "There's a mistake somewhere . . ."
In fact, I think that in arguing that things can get "better
and better, and better" by returning to mandatory screening,
Dr. Faden and her coworkers make two fundamental mis-
takes that cloud their laudatory instincts; the first is conclud-
ing that PKU screening must entail a choice between two
competing values; and the second is uncritically applying the
"harm principle" to a whole population scenario.
Values in Conflict?
The dilemma for those who want to reduce genetic
disease has traditionally been seen as one of governmental
effectiveness versus individual freedom. The notion has
been that to be effective, individual liberty must be sacri-
ficed. As Daniel Callahan noted almost a decade ago, the
real challenge is to find a "way of combining both logics."
This would be difficult, he opined, "if only because most
people find it easier to cope with one idea than with two at
the same time." And he described what would be involved:
It will mean taking the idea of free choice seriously,
allowing parents to make their own choice without penal-
izing them socially for the choices they make, or con-
demning them for those choices which will increase the
financial costs to society. Part of the very meaning of
human community, I would contend, entails a willingness
of society to bear the social costs of individual freedom.3
The most remarkable finding of the Faden PKU survey
is not that irreconcilable values are in conflict, but that in
Maryland at least, we can simultaneously protect the values
of both beneficence and autonomy. We can permit PKU
screening programs to be voluntary without running any
substantial risk of missing an affected infant. Rejoicing
rather than anguishing seems a more appropriate response.
As the authors themselves note, "the chance of missing a
AJPH December 1982, Vol. 72, No. 12 1401
ANNAS
PKU infant at the observed rate of parental refusal (0.05 per
cent) is 100 times less than the chance of missing a PKU
infant because of a false negative test result." ' In fact, at the
observed rate of refusal, it would take 500 years before one
case is missed for this reason. Efforts aimed at decreasing
the number of false negatives rather than decreasing the
small number of parental refusals would seem more reason-
able.
Parental Autonomy
The authors correctly argue that the primary purpose of
parental autonomy in decision-making for their children is so
that they can provide their children with the opportunity to
grow and develop to be able to exercise their own autono-
my.45 Accordingly, when parents refuse standard medical
treatment for a child who will die or become seriously ill if he
or she is not treated, the state properly intercedes to ensure
treatment.4A6
But what if the child is not sick and the parents have not
withheld treatment for the child's condition? What if, as
Alice asked the Queen, no negligent or intentional detrimen-
tal act has been committed by the parents? Should the state
nonetheless force their children to be screened for diseases
which they almost certainly do not have? This is a much
more difficult question than the authors suggest.
The screening scenario is quite different than the dying
child scenerio. With the defective newborn, for example,
there is usually almost 100 per cent probability the child will
die without treatment.45 In PKU, of 14,000 infants, 13,999
will be healthy. The odds are overwhelming that if any
particular set of parents refuse screening, no detriment at all
will befall their child. The proper question is thus not the
individual-centered one which the authors pose: "Do par-
ents have the right to consign their children to a state of
irreversible mental retardation?", but rather the societal
one: "Is mandatory screening for PKU a legitimate exercise
of the state's public health powers?'7* This requires an
analysis of testing and treatment technologies, the incidence
of the disease, resource allocation, and the role of law in
promoting the nation's genetic well-being.
Of all mandatory newborn screening laws, PKU laws
have been the most vigorously defended, and with good
reason. The test is simple, safe, cost-effective, accurate, and
detects a severely disabling condition that can be successful-
ly treated if identified early. Newborns should be screened
for PKU. But, as the new data from the Faden study reveal,
*Stating the question in terms of parental rights to refuse
smacks of "blaming the victim" in this context. Although only
seven of the 27 refusers were studied, the authors note that five of
the seven had a "poor understanding of the screening." Perhaps the
explanation lies in the poor manner in which it was or was not
explained to them. Two of the mothers did not speak English, and
we do not know if an interpreter was available. The other two
women actually did have their children tested later, apparently by
their private pediatrician. These data not only lower the actual
number of "refusers" but also suggest that it could be lowered even
more by better explanations and the use of interpreters.
none of this necessarily means we need mandatory screening
laws.' What it could just as well indicate is that, while
mandatory laws helped to initially set up reasonably good
laboratories and testing procedures and helped alert practi-
tioners and the public to the disease and its test and
treatment, such mandatory laws are no longer necessary.
We may be able to return the public's autonomy without
sacrificing the program's efficiency.
The authors seem to miss this point by assuming that
any parental refusal must be both immoral and irrational.
The immorality has been dealt with previously. What about
rationality? First, people may have religious reasons for
refusing screening and, if their child is in no danger, these
should be respected. Secondly, parents may simply believe
that for them the risk is not worth the benefit.
Currently, the rate of false positives is much higher than
the rate of true positives, so it is much more likely that the
child will be falsely identified as affected with PKU than that
he/she will be accurately identified. This strikes the authors
as a trivial risk, although they do recognize a state "obliga-
tion to ensure adequate follow-up." Given their thoughtful
empirical work, I would have guessed they might propose a
study of the health implications of being identified as a false
positive. A recently concluded study of the parents of 60
infants in Massachusetts who were retested in a newborn
screening program found that the more accurate information
the parents obtained about the test and reason for the retest,
the less anxious and depressed they were. Nevertheless, 36
per cent of the parents of these normal infants reported
heightened concern about the health of their infant because
of the repeat testing. The authors could not determine how
long these concerns would last, or what actions they would
take. **
This may not strike one as an adequate reason for
refusing PKU screening. But look into the future when we
will be able to screen for 1,000 more diseases. Suppose, for
example, a computerized screening test for 1,000 conditions.
Suppose further that each of these tests has been so perfect-
ed that the false positive rate is only 1 per cent. Each infant
screened will then be diagnosed initially as suffering from 10
disorders, even though he/she suffers from none. If the false
positive rate is 5 per cent per test, he/she will appear to have
50 disorders, etc. The tests that are performed for rare
diseases, the more likely it is that pathology will be generat-
ed from the retesting procedures, and the more rational a
decision not to screen initially becomes. This is independent
of any stigma that may accompany a true positive diagnosis.8
The rare parent who refuses newborn screening, both today
and in the future, is likely to be viewed as either a child
neglector or an irrational anti-science fanatic. Neither label
seems accurate or helpful. Such labels seem to be the result
of uncritically applying the public health model, with its
**Personal communication from Dr. James Sorenson referring
to research that is completed but not yet published, i.e., Sorenson
JR, Levy HL, Mangione TW, Sepe SJ: "Parental Response to
Repeat Testing of 'False Positive' Infants in a Newborn Screening
Program."
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emphasis on the good of the entire population, to family
decisions where the-medical model, with its emphasis on the
good of the individual patient, is more appropriate.
The Role ofLaw in Public Health
Law can effectively promote the public's health. But in
the United States, law also promotes individual liberty.
Liberty should be sacrificed only when clearly necessary for
the public good.9-4 As the Faden study indicates, PKU
screening may not necessitate such a sacrifice.' The 1975
recommendations of the National Academy of Sciences
regarding genetic screening seem even more relevant today:
"Genetic screening is appropriate when:
"(1) There is evidence of substantial public benefit
and acceptance, and acceptance by medical practitioners.
"(2) Its feasibility has been investigated and it has
been found that benefits outweigh costs; appropriate
education can be carried out; test methods are satisfac-
tory; laboratory facilities are available; and resources
exist to deal with counseling, follow-up, and other conse-
quences of testing.
"(3) An investigative pretest of the program has
shown that costs are acceptable; education is effective;
informed consent is feasible; aims have . .. been defined
... qualified and effective counselors are available in
sufficient number....
"(4) The means are available to evaluate the effec-
tiveness and success of each step in the process."'3
(Emphasis added.)
In regard to mandatory statutes, the Academy's Com-
mittee specifically .recommended that "participation in a
genetic screening program should not be made mandatory by
law, but should be left to the discretion of the person tested
or, if a minor, of the parents or legal guardian."9 This latter
recommendation has been generally ignored, and almost all
states now have mandatory PKU screening programs. Mary-
land is an exception, but not without controversy. When its
consumer-majority Commission on Hereditary Disorders
recommended that its mandatory screening law be changed
to a voluntary one, the Maryland Chapter of the American
Academy of Pediatrics asked that the requirement for writ-
ten parental consent be deleted because "it feared that
informed consent would be extended to other routine proce-
dures and also that many parents would refuse to allow their
infants to be screened."'4
Their second fear turned out to be baseless, but the
Faden study should cause us to reexamine other "routine"
newborn procedures to determine if they are susceptible to
an informed consent approach. Dr. Faden, for example, uses
silver nitrate prophylaxis as an example of a procedure
parents should not be able to refuse.2 But why not? The
procedure helps the infant only if the mother suffers from
venereal disease at the time of birth. There are also less
irritating alternative drugs to silver nitrate. Why shouldn't
the mother be able to refuse this treatment (provided she
agrees to be tested for venereal disease), and why shouldn't
she be able to choose among drug treatment alternatives if
the child's eyes need treatment? Morally and legally, if the
parents can demonstrate that the treatment is not necessary,
they should be able to refuse it.6
Maryland's screening statute has long been considered
the best in the country and has been proposed as a model for
other states to emulate.7 Its most controversial provision-
the requirement for written informed consent-has now
been proven feasible.' The proper response is not to change
the Maryland statute, but to renew the effort to get states
with mandatory statutes to reexamine the feasibility of
running an effective screening program on a voluntary basis.
Alice's legal conversation with the White Queen began
with a discussion of the advantages of "living backwards."
The Faden study should encourage us to at least look
backwards to the principles of voluntary screening so boldly
trumpeted in the mid-1970s and see if it is not possible to
implement effective screening programs that preserve liberty
in the 1980s.
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